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More than 1.3 billion people worldwide have no access to electricity and this has first-order effects on 
several development dimensions. In this paper we focus on the link between access to light and education. 
We randomly distribute solar lamps to 7th grade pupils in rural Kenya and monitor their educational 
outcomes throughout the year at quarterly frequency. We find that access to lights through solar lamps is a 
relevant and effective input to education. Our identification strategy accounts for spillovers by exploiting 
the variation in treatment at the pupil level and in treatment intensity across classes. We find a positive and 
significant intention-to-treat effect as well as a positive and significant spillover effect on control students. 
In a class with the average treatment intensity of our sample (43%), treated students experience an increase 
in math grades of 0.88 standard deviations. Moreover, we find a positive marginal effect of treatment 
intensity on control students: raising the share of treated students in a class by 10% increases grades of 
control students by 0.22 standard deviations. We exploit household geolocation to disentangle within-class 
and geographical spillovers. We show that geographical spillovers do not have a significant impact and 
within-school interaction is the main source of spillovers. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that the 
mechanism through which lamps affect students is by increasing co-studying at school especially after 
sunset. 
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1 Introduction
More than 1.3 billion people worldwide lack access to electricity and 40%
of them live in Sub-Saharan Africa (IEA, 2013). This means that roughly
a quarter of humanity lives without lights at home in the evening, without
power at the workplace during the day, and without the possibility of read-
ing and studying after dark. Energy poverty implies that most people are
strongly constrained in their standards of living.
In Africa, the electrical power grid reaches only about 400 million of the
continent’s 1 billion people. In urban and semi-urban areas, over 30% of
people have access to grid electricity. This figure drops to less than 2% in
rural areas. The electrical power grid is expanding slowly and unevenly.
Governments and the private sector are working to reach deeper into re-
mote areas, but financial, political and logistical barriers have proven to be
significant obstacles to overcome.
The link between energy access and education is an important and under-
explored dimension of development. Looking at aggregate data, we can see a
strong correlation between electrification rate and the completion of primary
schooling (see Figure 1). The lack of access to light limits the possibility
of studying after sunset and puts constraints on the time distribution of
activities by students. In developing countries, it is not uncommon to find
students of all ages gathering to read at night under the lights of a gas station
or a shop (see Figure 2).1 However, in rural areas, the lack of such basic
infrastructure means that even this option may not be possible. Electrifying
rural areas in developing countries is a long and costly process. By the time
this occurs, generations of students risk being affected by the lack of lighting,
undermining the process of human capital accumulation.
In this project, we evaluate the impact that solar lamps, which are a readily
available source of lighting, have on education. We distribute solar lamps to
7th grade students in off-grid rural areas, randomising treatment at the pupil
1The first picture, which made the headlines of major newspapers, refers to Daniel
Cabrera, a nine-year-old boy from the Philippines, who is studying under the lights of
a McDonald. The second picture is taken in Guinea and has been reported by the New
York Times and BBC.
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level. This is a novel experiment on a potentially key educational input for
development. As lamps can be easily shared we are interested in identifying
both the effects on the individuals who receive them and the spillovers on
their peers. To identify these effects we exploit the variation in whether a
student was given the lamp, determined through the randomisation of their
distribution, as well as the variation in treatment intensity, that is the share
of students in a given class who received the lamp. As we explain in detail
later, the variation in treatment intensity is driven by administrative glitches
that are uncorrelated with any outcome of interest.
The randomization at the pupil level and the variation of treatment intensity
across classes allow us to use an identification strategy based on the ran-
domised saturation approach as described in Baird et al. (2014) and McIn-
tosh et al. (2014). We find a positive and significant intention-to-treat effect
such that treated students in a class with the average treatment intensity of
our sample, which is about 43%, experience an increase in math grades of
0.88 standard deviations. Moreover, the lamp affects control students too,
such that increasing treatment intensity by 10% increases their math grades
by 0.22 standard deviations.2 Using data on the geolocation of households,
we exploit the variation in treatment intensity across the geographical ar-
eas around pupils induced by the randomisation. We do not find robust
evidence of geographical spillovers. Spillover effects appear to be driven by
within-class interaction between students. Finally, using a survey on stu-
dent’s habits and time use, we find suggestive evidence that the mechanism
through which the lamp affects students is by influencing studying habits;
especially, by increasing co-studying at school after sunset.
Our paper is related to the large literature on inputs to education in devel-
oping countries. Promoting human capital accumulation is one of the key
steps in the development process. The literature shows the importance of
building school infrastructure (Duflo, 2001; Burde & Linden, 2013); the rel-
evance of providing free primary education (Lucas & Mbiti, 2012); the effect
of subsidies to households and pupils on enrolment (Schultz, 2004; Angrist &
Lavy, 2009; Ambler et al., 2015); and the impact of monetary incentives on
2All results are robust to randomisation inference. We do not find effects on English,
Swahili, Science and Social Science.
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teachers’ performance (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011). Soft inputs
like information on schooling returns (Jensen, 2010) and involving parents
in school management (Gertler et al., 2012) have also been found to have a
positive impact on educational outcomes. Our paper is closer in spirit to the
literature that analyses the role of complementary inputs to education, such
as deworming programs (Miguel & Kremer, 2004) and flip-charts (Glewwe,
2002). Given the lack of electrification in developing countries, our contri-
bution is to investigate the importance of access to light as a key input for
education and to measure the spillover effects that access to light can have
on students.
Our paper is also related to the literature on energy access and develop-
ment, such as Dinkelman (2011), Rud (2012), and Lipscomb et al. (2013).
These papers are concerned with the effects of energy access on employ-
ment, industrialisation, human development and housing values. Our study
complements this field by focusing on education. An important distinction,
however, is that these studies examine the impact of electrification, which
is a large region-wide technology shock, whereas we evaluate the effect of
providing solar lamps, which is a smaller and idiosyncratic technology shock
that relates to a more easily available and cheaper source of energy access.
Finally, our paper speaks to the broader literature on randomised control
trials. Many experiments are likely to fail or have biased results because of
the presence of spillovers. Our paper provides methodological guidance on
how to use a randomised saturation approach, as described in Baird et al.
(2014) and McIntosh et al. (2014), in order to account for spillovers even if
the experiment was not initially designed for that. This requires variation in
treatment intensity that is as good as random and being able to approximate
the functional form underlying the relationship between treatment intensity
and the dependent variable.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the experiment struc-
ture; Section 3 discusses lamp usage and attrition; Section 4 shows that a
standard identification strategy that does not account for spillovers fails to
identify a significant intention-to-treat effect; Section 5 focuses on the role
of spillovers and identifies the intention-to-treat effect and spillovers disen-
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tangling the effects of within-class interaction and geographical proximity;
Section 6 provides suggestive evidence on the mechanism underlying the
spillover effects; and Section 7 concludes.
2 Project structure, randomisation, and source of
variation
The experiment involves about 300 students in 7th grade across 13 classes in
the Loitokitok and Nzaui districts, relatively close to the Tanzanian border
and mount Kilimanjaro (see Figure 3). We focus on schools in off-grid rural
areas where household electrification is below 2.6%.
The project started with a baseline survey in June 2013 when we inter-
viewed students and collected end of term grades from school transcripts.
Lamps were distributed to the treatment group in September 2013, at the
beginning of a new school term.3 We then collected end of term grades for
the treatment and control groups in November 2013, March 2014, and June
2014. We also rana extensive face-to-face surveys of students in November
2013 and March 2014.
The baseline survey covered 341 pupils. We were able to match 286 of these
with the transcripts of grades provided by the school and they constitute our
core sample, over which we conducted the randomisation. We distributed
solar lamps to 143 pupils and, in order to mitigate resentment and in the
interest of fairness, control students were promised that they would receive a
lamp at the end of the experiment.4 We randomise assignment to treatment
at the pupil level so that within each class some students were in the treat-
ment and some in the control group. We chose this level of randomisation to
maximise statistical power, given the budget and the size of our sample. In
our randomisation strategy, we seek balance between treatment and control
3The new academic years start in January. This implies that the students in our sample
started in 7th and finished in 8th grade. This contributed to attrition, as some students
in our sample did not graduate to 8th grade or changed schools. As we discuss in Section
3, attrition is unrelated to treatment status.
4Students in the control group received the lamp in September 2014.
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groups on grades, which is our dependent variable, gender, classes, and a
proxy for wealth.5
Given our sample size and the number of variables that we wanted to bal-
ance, we followed Bruhn & McKenzie (2009) and used a re-randomisation
method where we selected the allocation of lamps that minimised the sta-
tistical difference in means between control and treatment out of 10,000
draws (the so called MinMax t-stat method). We prefer this method to
stratification, because our sample size would have constrained the num-
ber of variables we could stratify on. In this way, we avoid strong imbal-
ance on several variables without forcing close balance on each. Moreover,
we chose re-randomisation rather than pairwise matching, because attrition
would posed the risk of leading to the loss of too many observations, poten-
tially invalidating the experiment. We follow recommendations in Bruhn &
McKenzie (2009) in the econometric analysis, and account for our randomi-
sation method by including balancing variables in the regression and also
running permutation tests to validate our inference.
Table 1 reports regressions of the baseline values of the balancing variables
on treatment over the sample at the beginning and at the end of our project;
the balance between treatment and control was well maintained throughout
our study. Moreover, we show that our sample is balanced also on other
relevant variables for which we did not explicitly seek balance, like hours of
studying at baseline, light source, school attendance, and mother’s educa-
tion.
In order to identify spillover effects we exploit the variation in class treat-
ment intensity, that is the share of students in a given class who received the
lamp. The variation in the treatment intensity between classes arose during
the process of matching survey responses with school transcripts at baseline.
Starting from the full sample of 341 students surveyed at baseline, a match
with transcripts was achieved for only 286 students. The match rate differed
across classes, leading to a variation in treatment intensity ranging between
5We construct a wealth index using a principal component analysis based on house
characteristics (e.g. type of walls, water, and toilet facilities) and a set of goods owned
(e.g. radio, telephone, bicycle, etc.).
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14% and 62% (see Table 4). We argue that the variation in the match rate
is random. Mismatches occured for reasons such as: major misspellings of
names in the survey; the use of Baptismal names in the survey and tra-
ditional names in the transcript; and inverting name and surname in the
transcripts. Figure 4 provides an example of a transcript. Our enumerators
did not use the transcripts as a reference for names when interviewing stu-
dents, but asked students their names directly. So, for example, a mismatch
occured when the student “Wambua Kyalo”, as reported in the transcript,
used his baptismal name “Jonathan Kyalo” in the survey.
Table 5 shows that matched and unmatched students are not statistically
different across key observable characteristics like hours of study, wealth,
mother’s education, source of light etc. Given the random nature of being
matched or unmatched, we argue that the two groups are balanced also on
unobservable characteristics, so that we have experimental variation in the
data. Table 6 reinforces this point by looking at balance at the class level.
It shows that treatment intensity across classes is balanced over gender,
teacher experience, wealth, and most grades.6 There is imbalance in grades
for science and social studies, but the content of the Kenyan Primary School
syllabus generates little complementarity between these subjects and math-
ematics, which is where we find an effect.7 Moreover, if we include grades at
baseline in science and social studies as control variables, our results hold.
3 Treatment compliance and attrition
We run two student surveys, 3 and 6 months after treatment. During these
follow-ups, we asked specific questions about lamp usage and appropriation.
In terms of appropriation, 84% of treated students reported that the lamp
stayed in their household when they were sleeping; the remaining 16% said
that the lamp was kept in school at night. The lamp was resistant and
broke in only three cases; in all the other cases the lamp was reported to
6A student in a class whose treatment intensity is 10% higher than another class tends
to have 1.9 extra points in mathematics, but this difference is not statistically insignificant.
7Note that science covers topics like vegetation, how to create compost, human diseases
and similar issues and not fields like physics or chemistry, which would have complemen-
tarities with math.
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be in good condition or with only minor problems. Moreover, in all cases
students declared that the solar charge was sufficient for either all or most
of the activities they wanted to carry out with the lamp. All these elements
suggest that compliance was high, implying that intention-to-treat will be
very close to the average treatment effect.8 Additionally, 97% of students
declared that studying was the main activity they used the lamp for.9
Despite experimental compliance in terms of lamp appropriation and usage
for studying, our experiment exhibits attrition coming from missing grades.
Grades are our main dependent variable of interest, but these are not always
available for all students in our sample. This could be, for example, because
they did not sit the end of term exam or left the school. Specifically, grades
data are missing for 13% of our initial sample in Term 1. This increases to
23% in Term 2, and to 39% in Term 3. After the exam in Term 1, students
were promoted from 7th to 8th grade. Unfortunately 16% of students in our
sample did not pass the exam and had to repeat 7th grade. This explains a
large share of attrition between Term 2 and 3, but not all of it. We regress
a dummy indicator for those repeating 7th grade on treatment and find an
insignificant coefficient.10 Moreover, in Table 2 we regress a dummy indica-
tor for students with missing grades on treatment and find no statistically
significant relation. Notice also that Table 1 shows that balance between
treatment and control over balancing and additional baseline variables is
preserved across all terms among students sitting the exam. Therefore, we
conclude that attrition is unrelated to treatment and that our results are
unlikely to be affected by attrition bias.
8We could not systematically check if students sold the lamp. In the first survey, we
asked students to bring the lamp to the interview. About 55% of them did, but many
declared that the lamp was installed at home in a way that was not easily removable.
Indeed, during our field visit, we saw many cases in which the lamp was wired in the
house and used as a proper lighting fixture. During the fieldwork, we visited households
at random and with no notice; in all cases the lamp was in the house. In light of this, we
believe lamp resale was minimal, if it happened at all.
940% of the students reported using the lamp to study all subjects equally, 25% to
study mainly mathematics, and 20% mainly science.
10The coefficient is 0.04 with a p-value of 0.34.
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4 Intention-to-treat effect: standard estimates
In this section, we run a series of reduced form regressions to identify the
impact of treatment on educational outcomes. Given randomisation, the
coefficients of the regressions have a causal interpretation. We show that
standard specifications, which do not account for spillover effects, fail to find
a significant effect of lamps.
We start our analysis by running an OLS estimation on a pooled cross-
section that includes all grades of the end-of-term exams that followed our
treatment. Our basic specification is the following:
yij = β0 + β1 Treatmentij + Zijγ + λj + ij (1)
where yij is the grade of student i in class j; λj captures class fixed effects;
and Zij is a vector of controls that includes student’s age, mother’s educa-
tion, and number of siblings. We also include the balancing variables used
in the re-randomisation as controls.
Then, we extend our analysis to a lagged dependent variable specification.
This allows controlling for past grades that, given the cumulative process
of education and learning, might influence current grades. We use grades
at baseline as the lagged dependent variable of reference. Therefore, we
estimate the following regression:11
yijt = β0 + β1 yij0 + β2 Treatmentij + Zijγ + λj + ijt (2)
Finally, we run a first difference estimation that allows us to control for
individual fixed effects. Despite the randomisation, this specification offers
an important robustness check. The first difference is taken with respect to
grades at baseline, so all time-invariant variables between the two periods
11Also in this case we include as controls the balancing variables used in the re-
randomization
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are controlled for through the transformation.12 Therefore, we estimate:
∆yijt = β0 + β1 Treatmentij + ijt (3)
Table 3 summarises the main findings of these specifications. We report
p-values for clustered standard errors in parentheses and those from per-
mutation test in brackets. We are unable to detect any treatment effect
independently from the specification used and the controls that are added.13
5 Accounting for spillover effects
The lack of intention-to-treat effect found in the previous section could be
due to the presence of spillovers. Spillovers can arise from: i) lamp sharing,
which increases the quantity and/or quality of study time for both treat-
ment and control students; ii) improved learning of treated students that
then share their knowledge with control students; and iii) competition from
control students who feel disadvantaged and increase their study effort. We
have evidence of source (i) from students surveys and fieldwork experience.
Moreover, we cannot rule out the presence of the other two sources. This
can explain why we do not find evidence of treatment effects by directly
comparing the performance of students in treatment and control groups.
For this reason in this section we implement an identification strategy that
allows us to account for the presence of spillovers. Moreover, although we
cannot distinguish between the sources of spillovers, we are able to disen-
tangle spillovers arising from within-class interaction and from geographical
proximity.
5.1 Within-class spillovers
In order to identify spillovers we use the econometric specification of a ran-
12The controls used in the other specifications are all time-invariant, so they are not
included in this case. When controls are included to account for differential trends we still
do not find an effect.
13We present the effect on the average grade across all subjects. We have also run these
specifications on each subject and on each end-of-term test separately, but the results are
still statistically insignificant.
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domised saturation design, as proposed by Baird et al. (2014), where satu-
ration is defined as the percentage of students treated within a class (treat-
ment intensity). This methodology allows for the identification of different
components of the experimental effect of treatment: spillovers on the con-
trol group, spillovers on the treated group, and treatment on the uniquely
treated. This methodology involves a two-step randomisation process: treat-
ment intensity is firstly randomised across clusters; then, individual treat-
ment is randomised within clusters. As argued above, our first step is as
good as random and the second step was randomised explicitly.
However, contrary to the original design of Baird et al. (2014), we do not
have a pure control group. Therefore, we follow an identification strategy
that addresses this limitation as in McIntosh et al. (2014). This involves esti-
mating the pure control outcome by imposing a functional form assumption
for the effect of treatment intensity on control students. As we analyse be-
low, a linear functional approximation seems appropriate in our case. Hence,
our econometric specification is:
yijt = βTreatmentij+µ(TIj ∗ δt)+γ(TIj ∗ Treatmentij ∗ δt)+δt+sij+ijt
(4)
where TIj captures treatment intensity in class j; δt is a time dummy for
the post-treatment period and sij are individual fixed effects.
Estimating regression (4) as a difference in difference model between a spe-
cific term date and grades at baseline is equivalent to estimating this sim-
plified version in first difference:
∆yijt = α+ β Treatmentij + µ TIj + γ(TIj ∗ Treatmentij) + ijt (5)
β is the treatment effect on the uniquely treated (TUT ) and captures the
theoretical intention-to-treat effect at the point of zero saturation. Defining
pij as the share of treated students in class j, TUT = E(∆yijt|Tij = 1, pij =
0)− E(∆yijt|Tij = 0, pij = 0), where Tij indicates if a student i in class j is
treated or not. The coefficient µ is the saturation slope for the control group
and captures spillovers on the control group: SC(pi) = E(∆yijt|Tij = 0, pij =
pi)−E(∆yijt|Tij = 0, pij = 0). γ is the differential of the saturation slope for
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the treated and measures the effect of changing saturation on the treated
compared to the control, so that µ + γ captures the spillover on treated,
defined as ST (pi) = E(∆yijt|Tij = 1, pij = pi) − E(∆yijt|Tij = 1, pij = 0).
This methodology allows us to compute the intention-to-treat measure as
the sum of the treatment on uniquely treated and of spillovers on treated
such that ITT (pi) = E(∆yijt|Tij = 1, pij = pi)− E(∆yijt|Tij = 0, pij = 0).
The results of this regression are presented in Table 7. We account for the
small number of clusters by i) calculating statistical significance relative to
the small sample t-distribution with eleven degrees of freedom while clus-
tering standard errors at the school level; and ii) re-calculating the p-values
using randomisation inference as in Rosenbaum (2002).
The results show a positive and significant intention-to-treat effect, such
that treated students in a class with average saturation improve grades in
mathematics by 0.88 standard deviation.14 The ITT increases with the
level of saturation and it ranges between 0.57 standard deviations at 16%
of saturation and 1.1 standard deviations at 62% saturation. Moreover, we
can see that there is a positive and significant spillover effect on the control
group. The estimates of µ are positive, significant, and large in magnitude
such that a 10% increase in saturation raises math grades of the control
group by 0.22 standard deviations.
As in McIntosh et al. (2014), we do not have a pure control group. Therefore,
our ITT estimates rely on an out-of-sample prediction that hinges on the
linear specification of the model. In Figure 5, we let the data speak for itself
and use a local polynomial smoother to analyse the relationship between
grade first difference of control students and treatment intensity. We find a
positive relation, which is what we would expect in the presence of spillovers,
and a linear functional form seems to be appropriate for the interval of our
data. Moreover, adding a squared term on treatment intensity to Equation 5
delivers insignificant results. Our estimates rest on the assumption that the
linear specification extends also between 0% and 14% saturation. However,
given evidence of positive spillover effects and treatment effects, our ITT
14The average class saturation in our sample is 43%. The intention-to-treat effect is
given by the linear combination of β + 0.43× (µ+ γ)
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estimates are more likely to provide a lower bound of the true effect due
to Jensen’s inequality. In fact, one might expect a concave function of
treatment intensity on grades at very low saturations. Providing a few
lamps to a class at zero saturation is likely to have a stronger effect than
providing additional lamps to a class where there is already a moderate level
of treatment saturation.
5.2 Geographical spillovers
Externalities may take place not only within the classroom, but also at the
homes of treated students. Students live in clusters of houses called bomas.
There are no roads or illumination to connect bomas, so pupils are unlikely
to move between them at night, as they may get lost or encounter wild
animals. However, students can interact around the house during daylight or
on their way to/from school. Therefore, Equation 5 needs to account for the
fact that some of the spillovers that we attribute to class-level interaction,
may actually be due to geographical proximity between treated and control
students.
We the exploit the exogenous variation in the geographical density of treat-
ment across pupils generated by the experiment. We collected the geo-
graphical coordinates of the houses where students live and we use this
information to construct a measure of the geographical treatment intensity.
For each student, we compute the percentage of treated students within a
radius of 500 meters, one kilometre, and 1.5 kilometres of their home. This
is will include both students in the same and in a different class, with the
latter accounting for about 23% of the variation in the data. We rely on the
following specification to identify the overall experimental effect accounting
for both within-class and geographical externalities, thereby disentangling
the two effects:
∆yijt = α+ β Treatmentij + µ TIj + γ(TIj ∗ Treatmentij)+
σ GTIik + φ(GTIik ∗ Treatmentij) + ijt
(6)
where GTIik is the geographical treatment intensity around student i within
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a radius k = 0.5, 1, 1.5 km.
Table 8 reports the results of Equation 6.15 We can see that a positive
and significant ITT is confirmed, such that a treated student in a class
and geographic location with average saturation improves her grades by 0.9
standard deviations. The results show a positive but not robustly significant
spillover effect on control students arising from geographical proximity to
treated pupils (coefficient σ). A 10% increase in geographical treatment
intensity within 1km leads to an increase in grades of control students by
0.047 standard deviations, but the result is not robust to randomisation
inference. Similarly, geographical spillovers on treated students are also
not robust to randomisation inference. Finally, the results in Table 8 show
that spillovers on control students associated with class treatment intensity
remain stable. Overall, we interpret these results as indicating that within-
class, rather than geographical spillovers, account for the bulk of the spillover
effects.
6 Mechanism underlying ITT and spillover effects:
suggestive evidence on study habits
The analysis of the survey on study habits and the distribution of student
activities over the day provides some insight into the underlying mechanism
through which lamps can affect treated students and generate spillovers
on controls. We find evidence consistent with the lamp influencing study
habits. Specifically, the availability of lamps appears to trigger increased
co-studying at school during the early evenings among both treated and
control students.
Our dependent variables of interest refer to study habits. Students were
asked i) if they usually study with other pupils, ii) where they co-study
(home vs. school), and iii) at which time of the day (before vs. after sun-
set). We apply the econometric specification in Equation (5) using these
responses as the dependent variable. However, in this case we do not have
15We report the results for geographical treatment intensity within 1km. Measures based
on a distance of 0.5 or 1.5 kms yield the same results. Details available upon request.
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the dependent variable at baseline, so we run regression (5) as a single cross-
section. Moreover, in this case the dependent variable is a dummy variable;
hence, the regression specification turns into a linear probability model and
the coefficients should be interpreted in probability terms.16 Given the lack
of baseline values of the dependent variables and the reliance on a single
cross-section with a limited number of observations, we interpret these re-
sults only as suggestive evidence of the relation between study habits and
lamp access.
In Table 9 we report the coefficients of the intention-to-treat and the spillover
effects on control for a set of study habits. The results on co-studying are
positive and significant in both cases, such that in a class with the aver-
age treatment intensity of our sample (43%), the incidence of co-studying
for treated students increase by 45 percentage points. Moreover, a 10% in-
crease in treatment intensity raises the incidence of co-studying for control
students by 10 percentage points. If we decompose co-studying by location
and timing, the stronger effect occurs for studying with others at school after
sunset. This suggests that an important channel through which the lamp
affects student performance is by allowing pupils to study together during
a period of the day that was previously less feasible due to the lack of light.
These results are consistent with the responses on lamp sharing and on time
use that students gave in our survey. In fact, 48% of treated respondents
declared they shared the lamp with other people when studying; 60% of these
that they shared the lamps with students of the same class and the remaining
shared primarily with siblings. When studying with other students, about
90% of the pupils reported to do so at school. Moreover, Figures 6 and 7
show the ITT on treated students at the average saturation in our sample
and the spillover effects on control for specific activities over different hours
of the day. The Figures report the coefficients estimated using specification
5 and the bands of the standard errors.17 The results confirm a significant
increase in the incidence of studying at school after sunset for both treated
and control students and also a slight reduction of work at home before
16As a robustness check, we also run a probit specification and all results are confirmed.
17We report cluster-adjusted standard errors. For ease of illustration we do not report
the standard errors from randomization inference, but the main results are robust to the
use of this approach.
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sunset.
There are various reasons that can explain why the lamp allows students
to spend more time at school in the evening. Anecdotal evidence from
experience in the field suggests that the most plausible explanations are
that, first, some lamps are used in class allowing the room to be lit in the
darker hours;18 second, the lamps allow students to walk home safely later in
the day, when sunset and darkness are approaching; and, finally, for treated
pupils, that students are no longer required to go home early to do chores
because they, or their parents, can undertake them more efficiently during
the evenings with the use of the lamps. The policy implication of the first
point is that electrifying schools, so that students can spend more time in
school and study together after class, can have a significant impact on human
capital accumulation.
As for the impact of co-studying on better grades we are unable to determine
whether this is due to better lighting itself or to the benefits of studying
together. However, given that only 48% of treated students stated they
shared the lamp with other students, lamp sharing is unlikely to account for
all the spillovers. Sharing of knowledge due to interactions between students,
as well as a competition effects, where control students increase study effort,
are plausible possible candidates. Further investigation using network data
on study partners could help to identify the different sources of spillovers.
An alternative explanation for the mechanism underlying the impact of the
lamps is that it could be related to the income effect that the lamp generates.
Das et al. (2013) show that increasing school inputs may affect household
spending responses and, in turn, learning outcomes. The lamp can help
generate savings on other lighting fuels, kerosene in particular. Indeed ev-
idence from student surveys and household expenditure surveys indicates
that families with treated students experience a reduction in fuel expendi-
ture of about 60-90 Ksh ($0.66-$1) per week. This is equivalent to around
10-15% of the median weekly income of households in our sample. More-
over, time use analysis on parents shows that the lamp allows mothers to do
18In some case teachers were keeping the lamps in the school and in other cases students
occasionally brought the lamp with them at school.
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chores more effectively at night, freeing time for other activities, especially
paid work, during the day and in the evenings.
To explore the possibility that improved learning outcomes could be at-
tributed to income effects associated with the lamp, we ran a household
expenditure survey after one year at the end of our experiment and we did
not find significant differences across expenditure categories between treat-
ment and control group. So the mechanisms highlighted by Das et al. (2013)
do not seem to hold in this context. Our findings are not inconsistent with
their results given that they find an effect on household expenditure in the
second year and only if the input was anticipated; our survey expenditure
was conducted after the first year and the input was not anticipated. Addi-
tionally, income effects would only explain spillover effects on grades if the
income effect itself spills over onto control households. These considerations
strengthen our confidence that the income effect on grades is unlikely to
explain the observed effects of the lamps on grades.
7 Conclusions
This study presents a novel experiment to assess the effect of access to
light on education. Through a randomised control trial, we document an
overall positive effect of solar lamps on education in rural Kenya. Once our
identification strategy takes into account the potential presence of spillovers,
we are able to find a positive and significant intention-to-treat effect and a
positive and significant spillover effect on the control group.
Given the small size of the technology shock that our experiment provides, all
our estimates are likely to be a lower bound to the true effect of lighting, and
energy access more in general, on education. Moreover, any experimental
issues like lamp appropriation by teachers and lamp sharing with students
in different classes, are likely to bias our estimates downwards. However,
solar lamps should not be seen as a substitute for electrification, but as
a short-term practical solution to limit the drawbacks on human capital
accumulation coming from the lack of electricity.
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We have also been able to disentangle within-class and geographical spillovers.
Most of the spillovers arise from within-class interaction, while geographi-
cal proximity between treated and control students does not have a robust
effect. The mechanisms through which spillovers arise seem to be related to
increased co-studying at school, especially after sunset. Nevertheless, fur-
ther research into this topic with larger samples and in different settings may
help improve our understanding of the effects of light access on education
and the mechanisms that can enhance or limit such effects.
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Figure 1: Electricity access and primary schooling (WDI data,
electricity<100%)
Figure 2: Students and lack of electrification
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Figure 3: Area of intervention
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Figure 4: Example transcript
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Figure 5: Local polynomial smoother of control groups’ grades and class
treatment intensity
Figure 6: Intention-to-treat by time of day
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Figure 7: Saturation slope on control students by time of day
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Tables
Table 1: Balance between treatment and control on variables at baseline
Explanatory variable: treatment Initial randomisation End of Experiment
Balanced variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Mathematics 2.26 0.20 3.1 0.19
English -0.59 0.45 -091 0.60
Kiswahili -0.29 0.81 -0.91 0.55
Science 0.51 0.78 -0.20 0.93
Social Studies -1.44 0.29 -1.75 0.33
Gender 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.99
Wealth index 0.02 0.77 0.02 0.82
School 1 -0.06 0.23 -0.03 0.64
School 2 0.01 0.47 0.03 0.26
School 3 0.04 0.28 0.03 0.58
School 4 0.05* 0.09 0.08* 0.08
School 5 0.02 0.70 -0.04 0.37
School 6 -0.03 0.42 0.00 0.97
School 7 -0.03 0.12 -0.04 0.17
School 8 0.02 0.49 0.02 0.61
School 9 0.00 0.99 -0.02 0.49
School 10 0.02 0.57 0.02 0.68
School 11 -0.02 0.40 -0.04 0.29
School 12 -0.04 0.22 -0.02 0.49
Additional variables
Hours of study 0.11 0.79 0.16 0.76
Missed days of schools (previous month) 0.06 0.78 0.5* 0.07
Source of studying light: wood/candle 0.00 0.97 0.05 0.55
Source of studying light: kerosene -0.04 0.69 -0.05 0.60
Mother’s education 0.04 0.44 0.06 0.38
***. **, *, significant at the 1%level, 5% level, 10% level
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Table 2: Attrition
Y: Grades data available Term 1 Term 2 Term 3
Treatment 0.01 -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Grades at baseline -0.003*** -0.002 -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender -0.08** -0.19*** -0.21***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 286 286 286
***significant at the 1%level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 1%
level. Clustered standard errors at the school level in parentheses.
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Table 3: Intention-to-treat effect - Pooled regressions
Cross section Lagged dependent variable First difference
Y: Grades (1) (2) (1) (2) (1)
Treatment 0.047 0.048 -0.024 -0.008 -0.079
(0.60) (0.54) (0.77) (0.91) (0.47)







Number of 0.025 0.027
siblings (0.15) (0.18)
[0.55] [0.55]
Grades at 0.61 0.63
baseline (0.00)*** (0.00)***
[0.25] [0.48]
Observations 646 582 639 575 641
***significant at the 1%level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant
at the 10% level. P-Values from clustered standard errors at the school
level in parentheses () and p-values from permutation testing in brackets
[]. The dependent variable is the standardised grade in mathematics. All
specifications account for class fixed effects and balancing variables.
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Table 4: Treatment intensity variation
Treatment intensity Class size
Class 1 14.20% 7
Class 2 33.3% 18
Class 3 33.3% 36
Class 4 37.0% 27
Class 5 38.4% 13
Class 6 40.0% 15
Class 7 42.8% 28
Class 8 47.5% 40
Class 9 48.0% 25
Class 10 51.4% 35
Class 11 55.5% 9
Class 12 57.8% 38
Class 13 61.9% 21
Table 5: Mean difference between matched and unmatched students (t-test)
Explanatory variable: treatment intensity Coefficient p-value
Hours of study -0.35 0.48
Missed school days -0.16 0.55
N. of people in the household 0.31 0.63
Wealth index 0.06 0.12
Source of study light: kerosene 0.02 0.79
Mother education 0.05 0.41
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Table 6: Balance of treatment intensity





Social studies -27.7* 0.07
Gender 0.06 0.88
Wealth index -0.11 0.87
Teacher experience -5.86 0.38
Teacher education -0.17 0.81
Hours of study -1.06 0.71
N. of people in the household -1.86 0.67
Source of study light: kerosene -0.12 0.79
Mother education 0.66 0.52
***significant at the 1%level; * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7: RSD estimates - Pooled sample
Y: Grades in Mathematics
β, treatment on uniquely treated 0.37
(0.25)
[0.22]
µ, saturation slope on control 2.21
(0.026)**
[0.05]**




- Min Saturation (16.6%) 0.57
(0.06)*
[0.08]*
- Average Saturation (43%) 0.88
(0.028)**
[0.06]*




Marginal effect of 10% higher 0.22
treatment intensity on control students (0.026)**
[0.09]*
Marginal effect of 10% higher 0.11
treatment intensity on treated students (0.18)
[0.21]
Observations 641
***significant at the 1%level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at
the 1% level. P-Values from clustered adjusted standard errors at the school
level in parentheses () and p-values from randomisation inference in brack-
ets[]. The dependent variable is the standardised grade in mathematics.
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Table 8: Spillover effect with geographical estimates - Pooled sample
Y: Grades in Mathematics
β, treatment on uniquely treated 0.52
(0.12)
[0.15]
µ, class saturation slope on control 1.86
(0.002)***
[0.09]*
γ, differential class saturation slope on treatment -1.33
(0.089)*
[0.87]
σ, geo saturation slope on control 0.47
(0.019)**
[0.26]




Average Class Saturation (43%) 0.9
& Average Geo Saturation (37%) (0.000)***
[0.087]*
Spillover effects:
Marginal effect of 10% higher 0.18
class treatment intensity on control students (0.002)***
[0.09]*
Marginal effect of 10% higher 0.04
geo treatment intensity on control students (0.019)**
[0.23]
Marginal effect of 10% higher 0.05
class treatment intensity on treated students (0.27)
[0.30]
Marginal effect of 10% higher 0.04
geo treatment intensity on treated students (0.015)**
[0.33]
Observations 521
***significant at the 1%level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at
the 1% level. P-Values from clustered adjusted standard errors at the school
level in parentheses () and p-values from randomisation inference in brack-
ets[]. The dependent variable is the standardised grade in mathematics.
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Study with others 0.45 0.10
(0.01)** (0.01)***
[0.02]** [0.02]**
Study with others at school 0.31 0.05
after sunset (0.07)* (0.19)
[0.04]** [0.11]
Study with others at school -0.00 0.03
before sunset (1.00) (0.58)
[0.52] [0.28]
Study with others at home 0.16 0.03
after sunset (0.11) (0.19)
[0.13] [0.19]
Study with others at home 0.01 0.00
before sunset (0.35) (.)
[0.38] [0.45]
P-Values from clustered adjusted standard errors at the school level in paren-
theses () and p-values from randomisation inference in brackets[]. * p<0.1,
** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
33
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1437 Evangelia Leda Pateli Local and Sectoral Import Spillovers in 
Sweden 





Without My Medal on My Mind: 
Counterfactual Thinking and Other 
Determinants of Athlete Emotions 
1435 Andrew B. Bernard 
Andreas Moxnes 
Yukiko U. Saito 
 
Production Networks, Geography and Firm 
Performance 
1434 Zack Cooper 
Stephen Gibbons 
Matthew Skellern 
Does Competition from Private Surgical 
Centres Improve Public Hospitals’ 
Performance? Evidence from the English 
National Health Service 
1433 Nicholas Bloom 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
 
Management as a Technology? 
1432 Andrew B. Bernard 
Toshihiro Okubo 
 
Product Switching and the Business Cycle 
1431 Fabrice Defever 
Alejandro Riaño 
Protectionism through Exporting: Subsidies 
with Export Share Requirements in China 





Exporter Dynamics and Partial-Year Effects 
1429 Cletus C. Coughlin 
Dennis Novy 
 
Estimating Border Effects: The Impact of 
Spatial Aggregation 
1428 Alan Manning The Elusive Employment Effect of the 
Minimum Wage 




The Effect of Discretion on Procurement 
Performance 
1426 Andrew B. Bernard 
Andreas Moxnes and Karen 
Helene Ulltveit-Moe 
 
Two-sided Heterogeneity and Trade 




“Teaching to Teach” Literacy 
1424 Yatang Lin Where does the Wind Blow? Green 
Preferences and Spatial Misallocation in the 
Renewable Energy Sector 





1422 Stefano Gagliarducci 
Marco Manacorda  
Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the 
Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms 




1420 Andrew B. Bernard 
J. Bradford Jensen 
Stephen J. Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
 
Global Firms 
1419 Marco Manacorda 
Andrea Tesei 
Liberation Technology: Mobile Phones and 
Political Mobilization in Africa 
1418 Jeremiah Dittmar 
Ralf R. Meisenzahl 
State Capacity and Public Goods: 
Institutional Change, Human Capital and 
Growth in Early Modern Germany 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7673 Fax 020 7404 0612 
Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  
